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Abstract 
 
According to Lall (1997), the FDI are strongly interconnected with a series of variables, such 
as: economic conditions (markets, natural resources, competitiveness), host country policies 
(macro policies, private sector, trade and industry, FDI policies), as well as MNE strategy (risk 
perception, location, sourcing of products/inputs, integration transfer). Recent studies have 
shown that the relationship ‘FDI-Wages’ is significant and the two variables have one on one 
influence. More precisely, the low wages have the role to attract FDI and the high volume of 
FDI generates the increase of the wages on the destination’s country labor market. Also, the 
FDI augmentations determine inequalities on the structure of the wages. The paper analyses the 
‘behavior’ of the relationships between the volume of FDI and the level of wages, in Romania, 
using an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (Unrestricted VAR). Based on the impulse 
functions generated by the model, some principal conclusions have resulted:  
  (1) The impact of the FDI on the wages is not uniform during the year, depending 
usually on the FDI flow and also on the self-regulation way and reaction of the wages on the 
labor market; 
  (2) The impact of the wages on the FDI is temporally sinuous in short term. In this 
situation, the FDI flow does not depend entirely on the signals received by investors 
regarding the level of wages in the destination country. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
According to Lall (1997, p.18), the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) is strongly 
interconnected with a series of variables, such as: economic conditions (markets, natural 
resources, competitiveness), host country policies (macro policies, private sector, trade 
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and industry, FDI policies), as well as MNE strategy (risk perception, location, sourcing 
of products/inputs, integration transfer).  
The competitiveness, one of the economic conditions, refers to labor availability, 
wages, skills, trainability, managerial technical skills, input access, infrastructure, 
supplier base, technology and financial support. In fact, the wages are an appreciable 
impact to the FDI, but over the time the skills and technical efficiency become more 
important. 
Recent studies have shown that the relationship ‘FDI-Wages’ is significant and the 
two variables have one on one influence. In such conditions, we can identify two 
statements of the relationship between FDI and wages: (a) ‘Wages first and FDI later’, 
that means wages have the capacity to modify FDI; and (b) ‘FDI first and wages later’, 
that means FDI generates the changes in the level of wages.  
Moreover, the field literature offers contradictory results about the sign of the 
relationship between FDI and wages. This could have the same sign, but also contrary, no 
matter which statement is considered (‘Wages first and FDI later’ or ‘FDI first and wages 
later’).  
 
2.  Theoretical fundaments 
  
(a) In the first statement’s case - ‘Wages first and FDI later’, Marr (1997, p. 6) 
argues that the decision to invest in low-income country has been heavily influenced by 
the prevailing low wage rate and the rapid growth in FDI has also been attributed 
primarily to the availability of low-cost labour. Moreover, in some countries when the 
cost of labor is relatively insignificant (when wage rates vary little from country to 
country), the skills of the labor force are expected to have an impact on decisions about 
FDI location.  
For Holland and Pain (1998, p. 7), ‘the cost of labor in the host country is a 
potentially major factor in the location decision, particularly for firms seeking to produce 
labor intensive products for export’. According to Resmini (1999, p. 15), ‘the relevant 
presence of small investors and high percentage of foreign investments realized in the 
traditional sectors suggest that the endowment of labor force and its relative price may 
play a role in attracting FDI’. 
On the contrary, Coughlin and Segev (1999, p. 12) reveal that ‘higher wages 
should deter foreign investment. In concrete, since higher wages might be due to higher 
productivity, ideally employee productivity should be controlled for in the regression 
analysis. However, they confirm that the past studies of FDI have found somewhat 
conflicting results for the effect of wages, but this is likely due to some extent to the 
omission of a productivity variable’. The study of Rahmah and Ishak (2003, p. 1), shows 
that ‘the labor market determinants differ between countries in terms of their role in FDI 
inflows’. The authors’ results suggest that, with regard to labor market competitiveness, 
different countries may require different policy recommendations in order to attract FDI 
inflows into their countries.  
Volume 3 issue 2.indd   42 Volume 3 issue 2.indd   42 9/12/2010   10:13:31 πμ 9/12/2010   10:13:31 πμ43 
A VAR Analysis of FDI and Wages: The Romania’s Case
Amaro and Miles (2006, p. 3) consider that ‘the opening of low wage nations to 
FDI has created much more competition for investment since the beginning of the 1990s’. 
Their analysis is made to determine the impact of both low wages and infrastructure as 
determinants of FDI. For Kyrkilis, Pantelidis and Delis (2008, p. 4), ‘the labor cost and 
labor quality hold a prominent position in attracting FDI. Even though the empirical 
evidence is somewhat mixed, low wage costs prove that they have played a significant 
role in attracting FDI in developing countries, but the average wage was chosen as the 
approximation for labor cost with a negative relationship with FDI’.  
(b) In the second statement’s case - ‘FDI first and Wages later’, Aitken, Harrison 
and Lipsey (1995, p. 22), analyzing the relationships between wages and foreign direct 
investment in Mexico, Venezuela and the United States, find that ‘higher levels of foreign 
direct investments are associated with higher wages’.  
In the same spirit, Faggio (2003, p. 29), exploring the interaction between wages 
and foreign investment in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, despite different economic 
conditions and levels of development, find that ‘across all three countries higher levels of 
FDI are associated with higher manufacturing wages’. Almeida (2004, p. 18-19) 
considers that ‘foreign firms have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages for 
all education groups even after accounting for sector and regional composition, as well as 
other firm and worker level characteristics usually not accounted for due to lack of data’. 
On the contrary, the results of Vijaya and Kaltani (2007, p. 1) indicate that ‘FDI 
Flows have a negative impact on overall wages in the manufacturing sector and this 
impact is stronger for female wages’. They argue that one possible explanation for such 
an impact may be a decrease in the bargaining power of labor due to new labor market 
arrangements in a global economy where capital is free to move across countries in 
search of more favorable conditions. Tomohara and Yokota (2007, p. 10), examining 
whether FDI inward is a source of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in 
developing countries, show that the ‘multinational companies tend to pay higher wages, 
even after controlling for factors such as industry and workers characteristics’.  
Recent authors, such as Decreuse and Maarek (2008, p. 2), argue that ‘FDI can 
have negative effects on the labor share of income, even though foreign firms pay higher 
wages than local firms and FDI benefit all the workers’. In the same time, Hale and Long 
(2008, p. 23) accept that ‘the FDI presence in China is putting an upward pressure on 
wages of skilled workers through increased competition in the market for skilled labor, 
which are reflected in an increase in wages that private firms pay to their skilled workers 
and in a decline in quality of skilled labor in SOEs that appear to be constrained in terms 
of wages they can pay to their employees’. 
  Finally, we can note that the field literature offers contradictory results about the 
sign of the relationship between FDI and wages. Generally, it is considered that the low 
wages have the role to attract FDI and the high volume of FDI generates the increase of 
the wages on the destination’s country labor market. Also, the FDI augmentations 
determine inequalities on the structure of the wages. 
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  According to the mentioned premise, all the theoretical elements presented allow 
us to formulate two theoretical working assumptions. The hypotheses are: 
 H 1: The statement ‘Wages first and FDI later’: The level of FDI is growing as the 
wages are decreasing. 
 H 2: The statement ‘FDI first and Wages later’: The level of wages is growing as the 
FDI is increasing.  
  In summary, the meanings of the hypothesis’ work relations are: 
 
Table 1: The ‘sings’ of the hypothesis’ work relations 
The statement 
Variable and  
‘tendency sign’ 
Variable and  
‘tendency sign’ 
‘Wages first and FDI later’  Wages  + or –  FDI – or + 
‘FDI first and Wages later’  FDI + or –  Wages  + or – 
 
  In this assumption approach, the first statement’s case relives that the relationship 
between wages and FDI have contrary sign (if the wages increase, the FDI decreases and 
vice-versa) and the second statement’s case consider that the connexion ‘FDI-wages’ 
have the same sign (if the FDI grows, the wages increase and vice-versa).   
 
3.  Methods and results 
 
Because the relationship between the two variables ‘Foreign Direct Investment - FDI’ 
and ‘Wages - W’ has a double sense, based on theoretical working assumptions, for analysis 
of the ‘binome’ we consider a vector autoregression model (VAR). This model is commonly 
used for forecasting systems of interrelated time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact 
of random disturbances on the system of variables. Moreover, according to Gujarati (2004, 
p. 848), in vector autoregression models some variables are treated as endogenous and some 
as exogenous or predetermined (exogenous plus lagged endogenous). 
In this case, the two considered variables - FDI and W - are treated as endogenous 
variables. Assuming that each of the two equations contains k lag values of FDI and W, 
for the t period, the VAR can be written: 
kk
tj t j j t j 1 t
j1 j1
FDI Įȕ FDI Ȗ Wu 
  
    ¦¦                                  (1) 
kk
'
tj t j j t j 2 t
j1 j1
W Įĳ FDI ȝ Wu 
  
    ¦¦                                   (2) 
or, equivalently, in matrix form: 
tt 1 k k t k 1 t 11
'
t1 1 t 1 k k t k 2 t
Į FDI FDI ȕ  Ȗ FDI u ȕ  Ȗ
 ...  
W ĳ  ȝ W ĳ  ȝ Wu Į


ªº ªº ª º ªº ª º ª º ªº
     «» «» « » «» « » « » «»
¬¼ ¬¼ ¬ ¼ ¬¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬¼
          (3) 
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where D,D
'are the intercept terms; E,J,M,P are the coefficients of the endogen variables; 
and the u are the stochastic error terms. 
The analysis data sets include the Foreign Investments Inflow in Romania (FDI) 
and the Net Average Wages (W), with monthly frequency, in nominal terms, in 
Romanian currency (Lei), communicated by The National Bank of Romania in its 
Monthly Bulletins, from January, 2002 to January, 2009 (85 observations).  
The principal steps of econometric analysis are: (a) variables’ tests for seasonality 
components; (b) unit root tests of variables; (c) VAR and joint lag selection; (d) pairwise 
Granger Causality Tests; and (e) residuals’ tests. 
(a) Variables’ tests for seasonality components use seasonal stacked line graphic 
methods. The graphic results are shown below: 
Graph 1: FDI seasonal components 
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Graph 2: Wages seasonal components 
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Both series reveal some seasonal components. In this situation, we have adjusted 
the series by X12 ARIMA additive method, used by United States Census Bureau. What 
is more, after adjustment, the variable FDI becomes FDISA and W becomes WSA. 
(b) Unit root tests of variables are based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The results, shown in Appendix (Table 1-7), in both unit root 
tests, suggest that FDISA is I(0) and WSA is I(1). 
(c) VAR and joint lags selection present the VAR constructions and the joint lags 
selection criteria. 
The VAR construction’s problem in our case is that one of series is stationary and 
another is non-stationary. We are working in levels, even if in the VAR methodologies all 
the variables should be stationary. The argument is that: 
‘The usual approach adopted by VAR aficionados is therefore to work in levels, 
even if some of these series are non-stationary. In this case, it is important to recognize 
the effect of unit roots on the distribution of estimators.’ (Harvey, 1990, p. 83). 
Also, Gujarati (1995, p. 749) affirms that transformations of the dates will not be 
easy if the model contains a mix of I(0) and I(1). 
For selection of the joint lags we consider two tests: the VAR Lag Order Selection 
Criteria and the VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests. 
(1) VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria illustrates (see Appendix, Table 8), for 5 
theoretical lags, that the 4 of 5 criteria (LR, FPE, AIC and HQ, exception SC) recommend 
a joint lags 4 in the case of VAR ‘FDISA-WSA’. 
(2) VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests (see Appendix, Table 9), for 5 theoretical lags; 
confirm the results of the first criteria, in which the joint lags for considered VAR is 4.  
In such conditions, for 4 joint lags, the ‘Unrestricted VAR FDISA-WSA’ may be 
written (see the estimates in Appendix, Table 10): 
 
44
tj t j j t j 1 t
j1 j1
FDI Įȕ FDI Ȗ Wu 
  
    ¦¦                                (4) 
44
'
tj t j j t j 2 t
j1 j1
W Įĳ FDI ȝ Wu 
  
    ¦¦                                (5) 
 
(d) Pairwise Granger Causality Tests verifies how much of the current FDISA can 
be explained by past values of FDISA and whether adding lagged values of WSA can 
improve the explanation and vice-versa. 
The Pairwise Granger Causality Tests, presented in Appendix, Table 11, for joint 
lags 4, suggests that we may reject the null hypothesis that ‘FDISA does not Granger 
cause WSA’ and ‘WSA does not Granger cause FDISA’. In this context, the FDISA helps 
in the prediction of WSA (FDISA Granger causes WSA) and vice-versa (WSA Granger 
causes FDISA).    
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(e) Residuals tests are focused to VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for 
Autocorrelations and VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests. The results of the two 
tests are illustrated in Appendix, Tables 12 and 13. Both tests show that the null 
hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation in residuals cannot be rejected (at limit in 
Portmanteau’s Tests).   
In conclusion, the ‘Unrestricted VAR FDISA-WSA’ model may be considered 
representative to describe, in Romanian’s case, the autoregressive connection between 
FDISA and WSA and vice-versa. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Based on the model, we can identify two impulse responses, because an impulse 
response function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on 
current and future values of the endogenous variables FDISA and WSA. In this case, the 
accumulated responses of FDISA and WSA to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E., 
for 12 months, are illustrated in Graph 3 and 4. 
 
 
Graph 3: Accumulated Response of FDISA to WSA 
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
 
 
 
 
Volume 3 issue 2.indd   47 Volume 3 issue 2.indd   47 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ48 
Mihai Ioan Mutascu and Anne-Marie Fleischer
Graph 4: Accumulated Response of WSA to FDISA 
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In this context, in Romania’s case, some principal conclusions have resulted:  
- The impact of the wages on the FDI is temporally sinuous in short term. In this 
situation, the FDI flow does not depend entirely on the signals received by investors 
regarding the level of wages in the destination country; 
- The impact of the FDI on the wages is not uniform during a year, depending 
usually by the FDI flow and also by the self-regulation way and reaction of the wages on 
the labor market. 
(a) In the first statement’s case - ‘Wages first and FDI later’, the results confirm 
our assumption hypothesis. In this case, the level of FDI is not growing as the wages are 
decreasing. The results infirm the conclusion of Marr (1997), Resmini (1999) and 
Kyrkilis, Pantelidis and Delis (2008), regarding the sign of ‘wages-FDI’ connection. In 
the same context, our results confirm the acquisition of Rahmah and Ishak (2003).   
  In Romania’s case, a +1% sock in WSA, determines a low level of FDISA inflow 
in the first month, an abrupt growth in the next two and a ‘flat increase’ trend in the next 
9 months. This means that the FDISA inflow has a high sensibility in very short-term (1 
month). The growth of FDISA inflow reactions in short-term (more then 1 month) could 
be explicated by the increase in the levels of labour productivity and quality, according 
Coughlin and Segev (1999). More, if the percent of wages in total production costs is 
low, then the ‘lent growth’ reaction of FDISA under the impact of wages increase is 
explicable. 
(b) In the second statement’s case - ‘FDI first and Wages later’, the results confirm 
our assumption hypothesis. In this case, the level of WSA is growing as the FDISA are 
increasing. The results are in accord with the conclusions of Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey 
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(1995), Faggio (2003), Hale and Long (2008), Decreuse and Maarek (2008) and Hale and 
Long (2008), but differ from the acquisitions of Tomohara and Yokota (2007) and, 
partially, Tomohara and Yokota (2007). 
In the considered case, a +1% sock in FDISA, determines a low level of WSA in 
the first tree months and an ‘accentuate increase’ of WSA in the next 9 months. This fact 
is generated by the arguments that, on the one hand, a ‘self-regulation’ of the labor 
market at a labor force supply and demand level exists, and on the other hand, the 
competition in the market for skilled labor is increasing. 
Also, the situations could be the result of competition in the labor market between 
multinational firms (Tomohara and Yokota, 2007), multinational firms and Romania’s 
local firms (Decreuse and Maarek, 2008) or between private firms from Romania’s local 
labor market (Hale and Long, 2008).    
The effects of reaction function are most pronounced in the second statement’s 
case, then in the first one. This means that the FDISA is more sensible to the WSA 
impact, then WSA to the FDISA. In the same time, the reaction of FDISA to WSA 
impulse has a high sensibility in very short-term (1 month) and depends on short-term by 
total production cost structures (the percentage of wages in total production cost is low) 
and labour productivity and quality.  
On the contrary, the WSA response to FDISA impulse is the result of the competition 
in the skilled labor market between multinational firms and Romania’s local firms and of 
‘self-regulation’ of the labor market at a labor force supply and demand level.    
 
 
References 
 
Aitken, B., Harrison, A., Lipsey, R., 1995, ‘Wages and foreign ownership: A comparative 
study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States’, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper Series 5102. 
Almeida, R., 2004, ‘The Labor Market Effects of Foreign-owned Firms’, World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper 3300.   
Amaro, A., Miles, W., 2006, ‘Racing to the bottom for FDI? The changing role of labor 
costs and infrastructure’, The Journal of Developing Areas, Volume 40, Number 1. 
Coughlin, C., Segev, E., 1999, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Spatial 
Econometric Study’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers, Working 
Paper 1999-001A.  
Decreuse, B., Maarek, P., 2008, ‘FDI and the labor share in developing countries: a 
theory and some evidence’, MPRA, Paper 11224. 
Faggio, G., 2003, ‘Foreign direct investment and wages in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
FLOWENLA, Discussion Paper 10. 
Gujarati, D., 2004, Basic Econometrics, Fourth Edition, The McGraw-Hill Companies.  
Gujarati, D., 1995, Basic Econometrics, Third Edition, The McGraw-Hill International.  
Volume 3 issue 2.indd   49 Volume 3 issue 2.indd   49 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ50 
Mihai Ioan Mutascu and Anne-Marie Fleischer
Halle, G., Long, C., 2008, ‘Did Foreign Direct Investment Put an Upward Pressure on 
Wages in China?’, Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2006-25.  
Harvey, A., 1990, The econometric Analysis of Time Series, The MIT Press, 2
nd ed., 
Cambridge. 
Holland, D., Pain, N., 1998, ‘The Determinants and Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
in the Transition Economies: A Panel Data Analysis’, ACE project grant from the 
European Commission (Project No. P96-6086-R). 
Kyrkilis, D., Pantelidis, P., Delis T., 2008, ‘Determinants of inward Foreign Direct 
Investment: The case of China’, 7th Annual Meeting of the EEFS International 
Conference, Prague. 
Lall, S., 1997, ‘Attracting foreign investment: new trends, sources and policies’, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Economic Affairs Division, Economic Paper 31.  
Marr, A., 1997, ‘Foreign direct investment flows to low-income countries: a review of the 
evidence’, Overseas Development Institute, Briefing paper, (3) September. 
Rahmah, I., Ishak, Y., 2003, ‘Labour market competitiveness and foreign direct 
investment: The case of Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines’, Papers Regional 
Science, 82, pp.389–402. 
Resmini, L., 1999, ‘The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment into the CEECs: New 
Evidence from Sectoral Patterns’, LICOS, Discussion Paper 83.  
Tomohara, A., Yokota, K., 2007, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Wage Inequality: Is 
Skill Upgrading the Culprit?’, The International Centre for the Study of East Asian 
Development, Kitakyushu, Working Paper Series 2007-14. 
Vijaya, R., Kaltani, L., 2007, ‘Foreign direct investment and wages: a bargaining power 
approach,’ Journal of World-Systems Research, XIII, 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volume 3 issue 2.indd   50 Volume 3 issue 2.indd   50 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ51 
A VAR Analysis of FDI and Wages: The Romania’s Case
Appendix 
Table 2: ADF ‘unit root’ test for FDISA - in level 
 
Null Hypothesis: FDISA has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -3.969918   0.0025 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.511262   
 5%  level    -2.896779   
 10%  level   -2.585626   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Table 3: PP ‘unit root’ test for FDISA - in level 
 
Null Hypothesis: FDISA has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Bandwidth: 5 (Newey-West using Bartlett kernel) 
      Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
Phillips-Perron test statistic  -7.382797   0.0000 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.510259   
 5%  level    -2.896346   
 10%  level   -2.585396   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Table 4: ADF ‘unit root’ test for WSA - in level 
 
Null Hypothesis: WSA has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   1.099655   0.9972 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.513344   
 5%  level    -2.897678   
 10%  level   -2.586103   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
 
Volume 3 issue 2.indd   51 Volume 3 issue 2.indd   51 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ 9/12/2010   10:13:32 πμ52 
Mihai Ioan Mutascu and Anne-Marie Fleischer
Table 5: ADF ‘unit root’ test for WSA - 1st difference 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(WSA) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -8.678852   0.0000 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.513344   
 5%  level    -2.897678   
 10%  level   -2.586103   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Table 6: PP ‘unit root’ test for WSA - in level 
 
Null Hypothesis: WSA has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic   1.099655   0.9972 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.513344   
 5%  level    -2.897678   
 10%  level   -2.586103   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Table 7: PP ‘unit root’ test for WSA - 1st difference 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(WSA) has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -8.678852   0.0000 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.513344   
 5%  level    -2.897678   
 10%  level   -2.586103   
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Table 8: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria         
Endogenous variables: WSA FDISA         
Exogenous variables: C          
Included observations: 80         
  Lag  LogL LR FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0  -1075.421  NA    1.71e+09   26.93553   26.99508   26.95940 
1  -935.5100   269.3286   57200129   23.53775    23.71640*   23.60938 
2 -928.0880    13.91625   52523572   23.45220   23.74995   23.57158 
3  -923.5768   8.232889   51886250   23.43942   23.85628   23.60655 
4  -913.7826    17.38479*    44934834*   23.29457*  23.83052    23.50945*
5  -912.6743   1.911832   48380586   23.36686   24.02191   23.62949 
 Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion     
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)    
 FPE: Final prediction error       
 AIC: Akaike information criterion       
 SC: Schwarz information criterion       
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion      
 
Table 9: VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests 
VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests   
Included observations: 80   
Chi-squared test statistics for lag exclusion: 
Numbers in [ ] are p-values   
 WSA  FDISA  Joint 
Lag 1   10.33481   2.094028   11.83395 
  [ 0.005699]  [ 0.350984]  [ 0.018630] 
Lag 2   1.757873   1.212232   3.320660 
  [ 0.415224]  [ 0.545465]  [ 0.505666] 
Lag 3   4.931144   0.786301   5.377916 
  [ 0.084960]  [ 0.674927]  [ 0.250671] 
Lag 4   18.19343   0.841669   18.74657 
  [ 0.000112]  [ 0.656499]  [ 0.000881] 
Lag 5   1.431584   0.452351   1.929203 
  [ 0.488805]  [ 0.797578]  [ 0.748778] 
df 2  2  4 
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Table 10: ‘Unrestricted Vector Autoregression FDISA-WSA’ estimates 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Included observations: 81 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 WSA  FDISA 
WSA(-1)   0.357944   3.655469 
   (0.11807)   (2.82926) 
  [ 3.03161]  [ 1.29203] 
WSA(-2)   0.189000  -3.139787 
   (0.12998)   (3.11467) 
 [  1.45405]  [-1.00806] 
WSA(-3) -0.013239  -0.588492 
   (0.12507)   (2.99702) 
 [-0.10585]  [-0.19636] 
WSA(-4)   0.419550   1.880287 
   (0.11429)   (2.73856) 
  [ 3.67106]  [ 0.68660] 
FDISA(-1)   0.007499  -0.043933 
   (0.00495)   (0.11857) 
 [  1.51550]  [-0.37053] 
FDISA(-2) -0.001597    0.081528 
   (0.00501)   (0.12010) 
 [-0.31858]  [  0.67883] 
FDISA(-3)   0.011730   0.113941 
   (0.00506)   (0.12125) 
  [ 2.31813]  [ 0.93974] 
FDISA(-4)   0.012569  -0.026554 
   (0.00522)   (0.12505) 
 [  2.40850]  [-0.21235] 
C   9.325167  -122.9193 
   (5.36787)   (128.627) 
 [  1.73722]  [-0.95563] 
 R-squared   0.981987   0.307769 
 Adj. R-squared   0.979985   0.230854 
 Sum sq. resids   17990.63   10330126 
 S.E. equation   15.80727   378.7796 
 F-statistic   490.6316   4.001438 
 Log likelihood -333.7619  -591.0571 
 Akaike AIC   8.463256   14.81623 
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 Schwarz SC   8.729306   15.08227 
 Mean dependent   297.4048   459.0141 
 S.D. dependent   111.7331   431.8991 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)   35422716 
 Determinant resid covariance   27988319 
 Log likelihood  -924.3336 
 Akaike information criterion   23.26750 
 Schwarz criterion   23.79960 
 
Table 11: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 06/19/09   Time: 10:54 
Sample: 2002M01 2009M01   
Lags: 4     
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
  FDISA does not Granger Cause WSA  81   3.70459   0.00847 
  WSA does not Granger Cause FDISA   2.48879   0.05075 
 
Table 12: VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations   
H0: no residual autocorrelations up to lag 4     
Date: 06/19/09   Time: 11:36       
Sample: 2002M01 2009M01       
Included observations: 81       
Lags Q-Stat  Prob. Adj  Q-Stat Prob.  df 
1   0.133313  NA*   0.134979  NA*  NA* 
2   1.285452  NA*   1.316286  NA*  NA* 
3   2.601136  NA*   2.682574  NA*  NA* 
4   2.696371  NA*   2.782756  NA*  NA* 
5   5.498544 
 0.239
9   5.769283   0.2171  4 
Note: *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
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Table 13: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order 4 
Date: 06/19/09   Time: 11:43 
Sample: 2002M01 2009M01 
Included observations: 81 
Lags LM-Stat  Prob 
1   1.441893   0.8369 
2   10.03376   0.0399 
3   5.574192   0.2333 
4   0.484115   0.9750 
5   3.707082   0.4471 
Note: Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
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